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The Future of Citizenship:  
Global and Digital – A Rejoinder
Liav Orgad
This has been an insightful discussion that touches upon some of the most 
fundamental concepts in political theory – communities, states, citizenship, 
and sovereignty. New technologies challenge the meaning and essence of these 
terms and blur the lines between physical and digital, local and global. The 
nature of the transformation is still a puzzle, but sooner rather than later the 
‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ will reach the institution of citizenship. The pos-
sible effects are promising but, as this GLOBALCIT debate shows, scary too.
My celebration of the potential of blockchain technologies to advance 
the idea of global citizenship lost in the GLOBALCIT digital agora, at least 
if we count ‘votes.’ There are four firm supporters (Primavera De Filippi, 
Francesca Strumia, Dora Kostakopoulou, Ehud Shapiro), five strong objec-
tors (Robert Post, Michael Blake, Peter Spiro, Lea Ypi, Dimitry Kochenov), 
and five people who are somewhere in between, acknowledging the poten-
tial yet expressing concerns (Rainer Bauböck, Costica Dumbrava, Yussef Al 
Tamimi, Jelena Dzankic, Stefania Milan). The objections are wide – theo-
retical and practical, empirical and normative, methodological and concep-
tual. The idea of blockchain-based global citizenship, which can lead to the 
development of cloud communities that seek to take part in international 
decision making, is seen as ‘techno-utopianism’ (Milan), ‘escapism’ 
(Kochenov), and ‘exclusion[ary]’ (Ypi), a risk to ‘territorial democracy’ 
(Bauböck) that may bring a ‘world without law’ (Post) and ‘legitimate coer-
cion’ that is so essential for the protection of human rights (Blake).
My kick-off had several premises. When discussing the need for an inter-
national legal persona for all human beings, I indicated three fundamental 
problems: human rights concerns (1.1 billion people do not have an official 
identification), lack of self-governance (individuals have no direct voice in 
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international law-making), and unequal representation (the principle of ‘one-
state, one-vote’ leads to disparities in individual voting power). I identified 
three developments – the rise of global interconnectedness, identity, and 
responsibility – that, taken together, can end up with the creation of an inter-
national legal persona and digital identity (as a form of ‘global citizenship’), 
thereby mitigating some of these problems. I also indicated one possible out-
come of global citizenship – the emergence of (top-down and bottom-up) 
decentralised ‘cloud communities’ in which global citizens, sharing a com-
mon bond, can be politically organised and collaborate with the purpose of 
influencing international decision making and, eventually, becoming part of it. 
The authors in this debate have not addressed the premises, yet challenged my 
observations (e.g., global interconnectedness) and my conclusion – the poten-
tial of global digital citizenship to do more good than harm. I cannot do justice 
to all the subtle replies, so let me first express my gratefulness to the partici-
pants – this has been enriching experience, although it has not changed my 
optimistic view – and briefly address below some issues that I see as central.
 Cloud computing
A large percentage of humanity is already engaged with some forms of cloud 
computing on a daily basis. Whenever you use Google Drive, Apple iCloud, 
and Dropbox, you spend time ‘in the cloud.’ Whenever you use audio and 
video streaming, online storage, and mobile services, you are ‘in the cloud.’ 
Government services, research data, medical records, and consumer services 
are available ‘in the cloud.’ Social networks too are ‘in the cloud.’ I have never 
physically met most of the authors who contributed to this debate, but I meet 
them on a daily basis on Facebook. The reason why we call these digital struc-
tures ‘cloud’ is not due to the lack of territory – the hardware is located some-
where – but because territory is largely irrelevant for the user and the service.
Cloud computing does not create, in and of itself, a ‘community’ (Post, 
Spiro), let alone a political community (Blake). Facebook is a social net-
work, not a political community. It is commercial and dictatorial – members 
have no common bond and cannot create law or engage in governance – and 
it does not guarantee a truthful unique identity. Yet, in recent years there 
have been attempts to create cloud-based ‘communities’ by using blockchain 
and other technologies. This started as private initiatives, such as Bitnation, 
but spread into government initiatives, as illustrated by Estonia’s e-resi-
dency. True, e-Estonia is far from creating a ‘community’; Estonia’s e-resi-
dents do not interact with one another or cooperate for political purposes. 
They are a group of clients more than a sovereign. It is also true that the 
notion of DBVNs (Decentralized Borderless Voluntary Nations), where any-
one can build a ‘community’ in a Pangea jurisdiction – an IKEA-style do-it-
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yourself nation – is unrealistic and undesirable. Still, the idea of a political 
community in which territory is largely irrelevant for certain political func-
tions is worth considering. Thus far, it has been regarded as radical because 
it was promoted by anarchists and like-minded people looking for disruptive 
technologies to replace the nation-state. But as technology becomes more 
developed, it is just a matter of time until the idea will crystallise.
 Political community
Even if the idea crystallises, can we really call cloud networks a ‘political 
community,’ or would they be like a ‘community of video gamers,’ to use 
Spiro’s analogy, or just an addition to global civil society (Bauböck, Post, 
Milan)? The essence of the community I envision is indeed political, having 
members who share a common bond (say, the protection of animal rights) 
and seek to become part of national (and mainly international) decision 
making. There are similarities between cloud communities and global civil 
society (Bauböck, Post, Milan) as they are both voluntary, political in nature, 
civil (in the sense of non-governmental), and usually non-profit. But there 
are some differences. The global civil society is not composed of sovereign 
political entities where decision making is based on a ‘one person, one vote’ 
principle; global civil society organisations are acting on behalf of a group, 
while decentralised cloud communities can form themselves democratic 
collectives acting on a global scale.
Do cloud communities merit being called ‘political communities’? It 
depends on the nature of such a community and how it will be developed. At 
least three components should come together: 1) members should have a 
self-perception as belonging to a collective entity, a shared consciousness of 
forming a political community; 2) members should have political relations 
and act with a collective responsibility; 3) members should be capable of act-
ing collectively with regard to some functions. Take immigrants, for exam-
ple. If all international migrants – more than 250 million people in 2017 – joined 
a virtual community, it would be the world’s fifth largest ‘country’ (after 
China, India, USA, and Indonesia). It could act as a self- governed collective 
at the international level, negotiating with states and UN agencies, collecting 
taxes, and promoting immigrant rights worldwide – all based not on repre-
sentatives or NGOs, but on direct decision-making by its members.
 Digital coercion
What about coercion – how can there be a political community without a 
recourse to force (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Dumbrava)? Normatively, the 
coercive force of law can be independent of the state or its territory; it 
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requires authority. Such authority exists also in a blockchain-based commu-
nity with one main difference – it is decentralised. If, for example, the 
‘migrant cloud community’ decides collectively to stop migration to a cer-
tain country that does not respect migrants’ rights or to buy products from 
certain retailers, and a migrant who is a member violates the rules, s/he can 
be sanctioned (through fines, suspension, limited access to rights/data, or 
termination of membership). As long as membership provides some bene-
fits, particularly the ability to influence and shape decisions that affect the 
member’s life, these sanctions are not minor or trivial.
Technologically, since membership is virtual, coercion is realised via 
software. As Shapiro notes, one’s virtual identity (or ‘global persona’) is 
programmed to obey the community’s decisions (‘coercion is achieved 
through design and programmability, without violence’). In fact, state laws 
represent ‘weak coercion’; there are papers that set rules (e.g., a prohibition 
of murder or crossing a red light) and one decides whether to follow the rules 
or violate them, in this case there are punishments and sanctions. Internet 
protocols are one step further. They are a form of ‘strong coercion’; internet 
codes (e.g., restrictions and blockings) are stronger than papers because the 
law of the software is more difficult to violate – it is not in the discretion of 
an individual but requires knowledge and effort. A digital society represents 
a form of ‘absolute coercion.’ Transaction monitoring (e.g., voting, tax, or 
registry) is governed by blockchain rules that one cannot violate.
Socially, ‘punishment’ in a digital society is of a different type. A person 
cannot be sent to jail, but her reputation can be discredited. In the digital era, 
reputation capital is a valuable asset and a factor for providing services and 
products (think of Airbnb, Uber, eBay). In other words, online reputation 
has a real-world value. As Al Tamimi observes, ‘A punishment in terms of 
such social devaluation imposed by the cloud state is conceivably more 
painful and restricting to the individual than traditional methods of punish-
ment, such as fines or jail.’
 Functional sovereignty
The territorial dimension of states has been seen central to citizenship (Bauböck, 
Post, Blake). Indeed, territory is considered the state’s most characteristic fea-
ture; states are, by definition (Article 1, Montevideo Convention, 19331), 
territorial units. Territory is considered necessary for assuming most of the nor-
mative functions of the state – for instance, as a source of security and identity, 
1 Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp
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and for managing natural resources. Against this background, the concept of a 
deterritorialised state – or cloud communities that would replace the state and 
fulfil all of its functions – is politically inconceivable. But this does not entail 
that none of the state’s essential functions can be reconceptualised. Cloud com-
munities are not a state-replacement, but an improvement – they seek to add a 
circle to the already dynamic and multi- layered rich dimensions of citizenship. 
They are not supposed to act in the physical world – and thus have no sover-
eignty on issues like murder (Post) – but to govern the transaction of values or 
data that exist in the digital world (voting, registries, certificates, etc.). However, 
as cloud communities become politically more important, what happens there 
will not remain confined to the cloud but influence real-world political 
decision-making.
The idea of ‘concentric circles’ of citizenship – to use Cicero metaphor – 
with each circle having a different normative function, is not foreign to the 
theory of sovereignty. There are three options: cloud communities can be 
seen as sub-sovereign entities, semi/quasi-sovereign entities, or functional 
sovereign entities. Let me focus on the third option – functional sovereignty. 
Under this approach, sovereignty is divided by functions, with each being 
governed by a different entity. Think of federal systems, a condominium of 
states, mandate/trusteeship, autonomy (e.g., Quebec or Puerto Rico), or 
municipalities (where certain functions are governed by local sovereignty). 
Divisible sovereignty can be exercised over territories – e.g. Andorra, which 
was a condominium before independence in 1993 and still had two heads of 
state (the French president and a Catalan bishop) – or peoples. Sovereignty 
can be divided between political entities, as in federations or in the European 
Union, or between political and nonpolitical entities – think of religion (in 
Israeli law, for example, religious law is sovereign in family issues). The idea 
of functional sovereignty, as coined by Willem Riphagen in 1975,2 enables 
entity A to have sovereignty over social welfare, entity B to be the sovereign 
on financial issues, and entity C to enjoy sovereignty over  security – all in the 
same territory. It also makes it possible for different political authorities to 
exercise functional sovereignty over different peoples in the same space. The 
switch is from a jurisdiction over territories to a jurisdiction over functions, 
peoples and services. As this is not a new concept, we can understand how it 
could be applied to blockchain-based cloud communities as well.
The normative functions of cloud communities remain an open question 
in the debate. My focus has been on global topics – global warming, the 
2 Riphagen, W. 1975. ‘Some Reflections on Functional Sovereignty’, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 6: 121–165.
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environment, and other issues of global sustainability – but it is for the states 
to decide which functions to delegate to self-sovereign communities. 
Ultimately, states would set the boundaries and decide the sensitive areas in 
which sovereignty cannot/should not be divided or shared.
 Coda
We can construct theoretical models of digital citizenship but, as this debate 
has shown, there are plenty of uncertainties – political, technological, and 
psychological ones – before it can become actually operative. I agree with 
Milan that ‘much work is needed . . . before we can proclaim the blockchain 
revolution.’ In particular, I share the concern about global inequality gener-
ated by ideas of cloud communities due to lack of internet access (Dzankic, 
Ypi, Kochenov) – this gap, however, has tremendously (and rapidly) nar-
rowed and in 104 states more than 80 per cent of the youth population (aged 
15–24) are now online. The situation will further improve if a right to inter-
net access is universally recognised. And I cannot but share Bauböck’s wor-
ries about the tyranny of the majority in the cloud – addressing it is a matter 
of constitutional design of voting mechanisms (note, however, that there 
will be judicial review, decisions that require supermajority, and perhaps 
even veto rights in the digital world as well). Discussing these (and others) 
concerns will keep theorists and policy makers busy in the years to come. 
While the focus of this debate is on global citizenship and virtual communi-
ties, I see it as a broader invitation to reflect on the nexus between new 
technologies and the future of citizenship.
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